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Duopolists in Output and Permit Markets: Interaction and Regulation

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  • Lappi, Pauli

Abstract

This paper studies the interaction between and the regulation of duopolists in imperfect permit and output markets. The interaction is modeled with a two-stage game in which the permit holding decision is made after the output decision. In the case of dominant buyer this results in a larger total output compared to the output level when the permit markets are perfect but the output market is imperfect. The opposite result holds for dominant sellers. In addition, the second-best regulation is characterized. It is shown that subsidies for permit buying and taxes for permit selling can be used as instruments to increase efficiency in both markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Lappi, Pauli, 2012. "Duopolists in Output and Permit Markets: Interaction and Regulation," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 279-293, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000018
    DOI: 10.1561/102.00000018
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    Cited by:

    1. Ollikka, Kimmo, 2014. "Essays on auction mechanisms and information in regulating pollution," Research Reports 66, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Ollikka, Kimmo, 2014. "Essays on auction mechanisms and information in regulating pollution," Research Reports P66, VATT Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot duopoly; Emission trading; Imperfect competition; Regulation; Strategic interaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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