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The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections

Author

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  • John S. Earle
  • Solomiya Shpak
  • Anton Shirikov
  • Scott Gehlbach

Abstract

We examine the use of proxies, shell companies, and offshore firms to defend property against seizure by private and state actors. Our theoretical framework emphasizes the role of political connections in defensive ownership. Linking information from investigative journalists on the key holdings of numerous Ukrainian oligarchs with firm-level administrative data on formal ownership ties, we observe some form of defensive ownership among more than two-thirds of oligarch-controlled firms, but such conduct is much less common for those connected to the incumbent regime. Further exploiting the abrupt shock to political connections that accompanied the Orange Revolution, we find a sharp rise in defensive ownership among previously connected oligarchs.

Suggested Citation

  • John S. Earle & Solomiya Shpak & Anton Shirikov & Scott Gehlbach, 2022. "The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(4), pages 513-546, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00020228
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00020228
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    Cited by:

    1. Kerim Can Kavakli & Giovanna Marcolongo & Diego Zambiasi, 2023. "Sanction Evasion Through Tax Havens," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23212, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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