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Showing Off: Promise and Peril in Unilateral Policymaking

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  • Judd, Gleason

Abstract

Presidents have substantial unilateral policymaking powers in the United States despite constitutional provisions for checks and balances. I study how electoral concerns encourage officeholders to exercise these powers, using a formal model in which unilateral policymaking skill varies across officeholders and is unknown to voters. Undesirable unilateral action is unavoidable in equilibrium under broad conditions. This perverse behavior occurs when the incumbent acts unilaterally to show off policymaking skill even though unilateral action is inferior policy. Showing off is driven by electoral motivations and occurs because unilateral action is important for re-election. I also characterize conditions under which the incumbent acts unilaterally in equilibrium if and only if it improves voter welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Judd, Gleason, 2017. "Showing Off: Promise and Peril in Unilateral Policymaking," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 241-268, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00016144
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00016144
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    Cited by:

    1. Gleason Judd & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2020. "Flexibility or Stability? Analyzing Proposals to Reform the Separation of Powers," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 309-324, April.
    2. Turner, Ian R, 2021. "Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism," SocArXiv stnzf, Center for Open Science.

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