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Fair Play in Assemblies

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  • Gibilisco, Michael

Abstract

This paper studies the conditions under which minority proposal rights emerge from majority voting in a legislature. I develop a legislative bargaining model in which rules persist, i.e., remain in effect until a majority agrees to change them. In each session, legislators first determine whether a minority leader can offer amendments, and subsequently they determine policy using these procedures and majority rule. The main result demonstrates that legislative majorities grant minority rights today in order to moderate policy tomorrow when they may become the minority. This mechanism operates without punishment strategies and private information and in the presence of polarized and unified parties; however, persistent rules are necessary for the right to substantively influence policies. Comparative statics indicate that weak parties, super-majority rule, patient legislators, and extreme proposers encourage the adoption of minority rights. More broadly, these results demonstrate the importance of persistent rules for the endurance of inclusive institutions and political compromises, and they suggest one reason for procedural differences between the House and Senate.

Suggested Citation

  • Gibilisco, Michael, 2015. "Fair Play in Assemblies," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 10(3), pages 275-320, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00014155
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00014155
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    Cited by:

    1. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.

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