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Medidas antidumping e resultados colusivos: o caso do PEBDL na economia brasileira [Antidumping measures and collusive results: The PEBDL case in the Brazilian economy]

Author

Listed:
  • Cláudio Roberto Fóffano Vasconcelos

    (FURG)

  • Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos

    (FURG)

Abstract

The literature shows that the application of antidumping legislation can have a major effect on international trade. The threat of invoking the law can be used to obtain a collusive agreement or to punish a deviation from an existing agreement made between domestic and foreign firms. Thus, the objective of this study was to examine whether the request by petitioners to withdraw dumping investigation concerning LLDPE (linear low density polyethylene) served to support collusion in the Brazilian economy. The results show that this withdrawal does not point to a collusive agreement between domestic and foreign firms in this industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Cláudio Roberto Fóffano Vasconcelos & Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos, 2005. "Medidas antidumping e resultados colusivos: o caso do PEBDL na economia brasileira [Antidumping measures and collusive results: The PEBDL case in the Brazilian economy]," Nova Economia, Economics Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (Brazil), vol. 15(3), pages 117-141, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:nov:artigo:v:15:y:2005:i:3:p:117-141
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dumping; collusion; international trade regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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