IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nos/voprec/y2005id1461.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • K. Sonin

Abstract

In unequal societies, the rich may benefit from shaping economic institutions in their favor. This paper analyzes the dynamics of institutional subversion by focusing on public protection of property rights. If this institution functions imperfectly, agents have incentives to invest in private protection of property rights. The ability to maintain private protection systems makes the rich natural opponents of public protection of property rights and precludes grass-roots demand to drive the development of the market-friendly institution. The economy becomes stuck in a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and wide-spread rent-seeking. The Russian oligarchs of the 1990s, who controlled large stakes of newly privatized property, provide motivation for this paper.

Suggested Citation

  • K. Sonin, 2005. "Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 7.
    • Handle: RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2005:id:1461
    DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2005-7-4-18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.vopreco.ru/jour/article/viewFile/1461/1463
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-7-4-18?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2005:id:1461. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: NEICON (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.vopreco.ru .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.