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Complexity, Tertiariness and Healthcare: Unresolved Issues of Reimbursement and Incentives

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  • Ernst, Chris
  • Rouse, Paul

Abstract

Although “complexity” in health care is commonly associated with “tertiary” hospitals in many countries, there is no accepted defini- tion of tertiariness or agreement on structural and funding arrange- ments. This paper attempts a conceptual analysis of complexity in tertiary hospitals in terms of clinical views, capability requirements and process-orientations. The main insight is that we need a de- mand- and process based concept of tertiariness because a supply- side concept is not operational. The paper also develops some ideas what such a demand-based concept would look like.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernst, Chris & Rouse, Paul, 2016. "Complexity, Tertiariness and Healthcare: Unresolved Issues of Reimbursement and Incentives," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 70(3), pages 227-247.
    • Handle: RePEc:nms:untern:10.5771/0042-059x-2016-3-227
    DOI: 10.5771/0042-059X-2016-3-227
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    Cited by:

    1. Shuguang Lin & Paul Rouse & Fan Zhang & Ying‐Ming Wang, 2021. "Measuring work complexity for acute care services," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(6), pages 2199-2214, November.

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