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Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations – history and evolution from the perspective of commercial banks’ ability to meet liquidity requirements

Author

Listed:
  • Paweł Kowalewski

    (Narodowy Bank Polski.)

  • Błażej Lepczyński

    (Uniwersytet Gdański)

Abstract

The outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2008 forced the largest central banks to use new tools, which gradually began to become part of their unconventional monetary policy. The most spectacular example of the new policy was asset purchases. However, due to the specific nature of the euro area, the ECB has long abstained from launching such purchases and, as a result, has long resorted to its constantly improved refinancing operations. As a result, these refinancing operations have become one of the most important tools of the Eurosystem. They retained their important role even after the ECB launched its expanded asset purchases in 2015, and the subsequent pandemic crisis further underlined their importance. Such operations contributed (together with asset purchases) to the creation of a huge excess liquidity, which had a significant impact on the behaviour of the participants of the banking system. The application of these operations coincided with the efforts of the supervisory authorities to gradually enforce the new liquidity requirements on banks. The aim of this article is to answer the question of how both the course of refinancing operations and their subsequent phasing out affected the ability of banks to meet these requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Paweł Kowalewski & Błażej Lepczyński, 2023. "Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations – history and evolution from the perspective of commercial banks’ ability to meet liquidity requirements," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 54(6), pages 577-606.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpbik:v:54:y:2023:i:6:p:577-606
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Morten Bech & Todd Keister, 2012. "On the liquidity coverage ratio and monetary policy implementation," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    interest rates; monetary policy; liquidity management; refinancing operations; macroprudentials;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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