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Reforming remuneration schemes in the financial industry : some governance and implementation issues

Author

Listed:
  • Joachim Keller

    (National Bank of Belgium)

  • Janet Mitchell

    (National Bank of Belgium)

  • Cristina Vespro

    (National Bank of Belgium)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Keller & Janet Mitchell & Cristina Vespro, 2009. "Reforming remuneration schemes in the financial industry : some governance and implementation issues," Financial Stability Review, National Bank of Belgium, vol. 7(1), pages 139-151, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbb:fsrart:v:7:y:2009:i:1:p:139-151
    as

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    File URL: http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/fsrart/fsr_2009_en_139_151.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, 2009. "Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909-2006," NBER Working Papers 14644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Johan Devriese & Mathias Dewatripont & Dirk Heremans & Grégory Nguyen, 2004. "Corporate governance, regulation and supervision of banks," Financial Stability Review, National Bank of Belgium, vol. 2(1), pages 95-120, June.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    6. Sabourian, H. & Sibert, A.C., 2009. "Banker Compensation and Confirmation Bias," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0940, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-1054.
    8. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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