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Kin selection and eusociality

Author

Listed:
  • Joan E. Strassmann

    (Rice University)

  • Robert E. Page

    (School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University)

  • Gene E. Robinson

    (and Institute for Genomic Biology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

  • Thomas D. Seeley

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

Arising from M. A. Nowak, C. E. Tarnita & E. O. Wilson Nature 466, 1057–1062 (2010)10.1038/nature09205 ; Nowak et al. reply Hamilton1 described a selective process in which individuals affect kin (kin selection), developed a novel modelling strategy for it (inclusive fitness), and derived a rule to describe it (Hamilton’s rule). Nowak et al.2 assert that inclusive fitness is not the best modelling strategy, and also that its production has been “meagre”. The former may be debated by theoreticians, but the latter is simply incorrect. There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that inclusive fitness, kin selection and Hamilton’s rule have been extraordinarily productive for understanding the evolution of sociality.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan E. Strassmann & Robert E. Page & Gene E. Robinson & Thomas D. Seeley, 2011. "Kin selection and eusociality," Nature, Nature, vol. 471(7339), pages 5-6, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:471:y:2011:i:7339:d:10.1038_nature09833
    DOI: 10.1038/nature09833
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.

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