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Evolution of an obligate social cheater to a superior cooperator

Author

Listed:
  • Francesca Fiegna

    (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology)

  • Yuen-Tsu N. Yu

    (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology)

  • Supriya V. Kadam

    (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology)

  • Gregory J. Velicer

    (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology)

Abstract

Obligate relationships have evolved many times and can be parasitic or mutualistic. Obligate organisms rely on others to survive and thus coevolve with their host or partner. An important but little explored question is whether obligate status is an evolutionarily terminal condition or whether obligate lineages can evolve back to an autonomous lifestyle. The bacterium Myxococcus xanthus survives starvation by the social development of spore-bearing fruiting bodies. Some M. xanthus genotypes defective at fruiting body development in isolation can nonetheless exploit proficient genotypes in chimaeric groups. Here we report an evolutionary transition from obligate dependence on an altruistic host to an autonomous mode of social cooperation. This restoration of social independence was caused by a single mutation of large effect that confers fitness superiority over both ancestral genotypes, including immunity from exploitation by the ancestral cheater. Thus, a temporary state of obligate cheating served as an evolutionary stepping-stone to a novel state of autonomous social dominance.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Fiegna & Yuen-Tsu N. Yu & Supriya V. Kadam & Gregory J. Velicer, 2006. "Evolution of an obligate social cheater to a superior cooperator," Nature, Nature, vol. 441(7091), pages 310-314, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:441:y:2006:i:7091:d:10.1038_nature04677
    DOI: 10.1038/nature04677
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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsushi Ohdaira & Takao Terano, 2009. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on the Second-Best Decision," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 12(4), pages 1-7.
    2. Kazufumi Hosoda & Shingo Suzuki & Yoshinori Yamauchi & Yasunori Shiroguchi & Akiko Kashiwagi & Naoaki Ono & Kotaro Mori & Tetsuya Yomo, 2011. "Cooperative Adaptation to Establishment of a Synthetic Bacterial Mutualism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(2), pages 1-9, February.
    3. Iwata, Shigehide & Kobayashi, Kazuyuki & Higa, Shinichiro & Yoshimura, Jin & Tainaka, Kei-ichi, 2011. "A simple population theory for mutualism by the use of lattice gas model," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 222(13), pages 2042-2048.
    4. Martin Schuster & Eric Foxall & David Finch & Hal Smith & Patrick De Leenheer, 2017. "Tragedy of the commons in the chemostat," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(12), pages 1-13, December.

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