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The good, the bad and the lonely

Author

Listed:
  • Franziska Michor

    (Harvard University)

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (the Institute for Advanced Study)

Abstract

In game theory, 'loners' who choose not to participate in fact promote cooperation between players. The dynamics of the game show phase transitions and complex phenomena reminiscent of statistical physics.

Suggested Citation

  • Franziska Michor & Martin A. Nowak, 2002. "The good, the bad and the lonely," Nature, Nature, vol. 419(6908), pages 677-679, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:419:y:2002:i:6908:d:10.1038_419677a
    DOI: 10.1038/419677a
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    Cited by:

    1. Som B Ale & Joel S Brown & Amy T Sullivan, 2013. "Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-8, May.
    2. Hu, Qi & Jin, Tao & Jiang, Yulian & Liu, Xingwen, 2024. "Reputation incentives with public supervision promote cooperation in evolutionary games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 466(C).
    3. Iwamura, Yoshiro & Nagashima, Keisuke & Tanimoto, Jun, 2020. "Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: Cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 370(C).

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