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Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment

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  • Till O. Weber

    (University College Dublin
    University College Dublin
    Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham)

  • Ori Weisel

    (Tel Aviv University)

  • Simon Gächter

    (Sir Clive Granger Building, University of Nottingham
    CESifo
    IZA Institute of Labour Economics)

Abstract

Strong reciprocity explains prosocial cooperation by the presence of individuals who incur costs to help those who helped them (‘strong positive reciprocity’) and to punish those who wronged them (‘strong negative reciprocity’). Theories of social preferences predict that in contrast to ‘strong reciprocators’, self-regarding people cooperate and punish only if there are sufficient future benefits. Here, we test this prediction in a two-stage design. First, participants are classified according to their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity as either dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected, DFR cooperate only when punishment is possible, whereas DCC cooperate without punishment. Surprisingly, dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity are unrelated to strong negative reciprocity: punishment by DCC and DFR is practically identical. The ‘burden of cooperation’ is thus carried by a larger set of individuals than previously assumed.

Suggested Citation

  • Till O. Weber & Ori Weisel & Simon Gächter, 2018. "Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 9(1), pages 1-9, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:9:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1038_s41467-018-04775-8
    DOI: 10.1038/s41467-018-04775-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Angelsen, Arild & Naime, Julia, 2024. "The mixed impacts of peer punishments on common-pool resources: Multi-country experimental evidence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    2. Till O. Weber & Benjamin Beranek & Simon Gaechter & Fatima Lambarraa-Lehnhardt & Jonathan F. Schulz, 2021. "The Behavioural Mechanisms of Voluntary Cooperation in WEIRD and Non-WEIRD Societies," Discussion Papers 2021-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Ramzi Suleiman & Yuval Samid, 2021. "Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-23, August.
    4. Hoeft, Leonard & Mill, Wladislaw, 2024. "Abuse of power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 305-324.
    5. Thöni, Christian & Volk, Stefan, 2018. "Conditional cooperation: Review and refinement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 37-40.
    6. Bergantino, Angela Stefania & Morone, Andrea & Gil Gallen, Sara, 2020. "Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperative behavior? Evidence from Public good experiment," MPRA Paper 104465, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Weber, Till O. & Schulz, Jonathan F. & Beranek, Benjamin & Lambarraa-Lehnhardt, Fatima & Gächter, Simon, 2023. "The behavioral mechanisms of voluntary cooperation across culturally diverse societies: Evidence from the US, the UK, Morocco, and Turkey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 134-152.
    8. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Celadin, Tatiana, 2022. "Social value orientation and conditional cooperation in the online one-shot public goods game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 243-272.
    9. Angela Stefania Bergantino & Sara Gil‐Gallen & Andrea Morone, 2023. "Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 39-73, March.

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