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On the psychology and economics of antisocial personality

Author

Listed:
  • J. B. Engelmann

    (Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Behavioral and Experimental Economics, The Tinbergen Institute, 1082 MS, Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • B. Schmid

    (Institute for Transport Planning and Systems (IVT), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, 8093 Zurich, Switzerland)

  • C. K. W. De Dreu

    (Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, 2333 AK, Leiden, The Netherlands)

  • J. Chumbley

    (Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development, University of Zurich, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland)

  • E. Fehr

    (Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland)

Abstract

How do fundamental concepts from economics, such as individuals’ preferences and beliefs, relate to equally fundamental concepts from psychology, such as relatively stable personality traits? Can personality traits help us better understand economic behavior across strategic contexts? We identify an antisocial personality profile and examine the role of strategic context (the “situation”), personality traits (the “person”), and their interaction on beliefs and behaviors in trust games. Antisocial individuals exhibit a specific combination of beliefs and preferences that is difficult to reconcile with a rational choice approach that assumes that beliefs about others’ behaviors are formed rationally and therefore, independently from preferences. Variations in antisocial personality are associated with effect sizes that are as large as strong variations in strategic context. Antisocial individuals have lower trust in others unless they know that they can punish them. They are also substantially less trustworthy, believe that others are like themselves, and respond to the possibility of being sanctioned more strongly, suggesting that they anticipate severe punishment if they betray their partner’s trust. Antisocial individuals are not simply acting in their economic self-interest, because they harshly punish those who do not reciprocate their trust, although that reduces their economic payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calculated manner. Antisocial individuals honor others’ trust significantly less (if they cannot be punished) but also, harshly punish those who betray their trust. Overall, it seems that antisocial individuals have beliefs and behaviors based on a view of the world that assumes that most others are as antisocial as they themselves are.

Suggested Citation

  • J. B. Engelmann & B. Schmid & C. K. W. De Dreu & J. Chumbley & E. Fehr, 2019. "On the psychology and economics of antisocial personality," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 116(26), pages 12781-12786, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:116:y:2019:p:12781-12786
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miettinen, Topi & Kosfeld, Michael & Fehr, Ernst & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-25.
    2. Gensowski, Miriam & Gørtz, Mette & Schurer, Stefanie, 2021. "Inequality in personality over the life cycle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 46-77.
    3. Légeret, Matthieu & Zehnder, Christian, 2022. "Self-regulation after temptation?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    4. Caliendo, Marco & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Silva-Goncalves, Juliana & Uhlendorff, Arne, 2024. "Locus of control and the preference for agency," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    5. Hirmas, Alejandro & Engelmann, Jan B., 2023. "Impulsiveness moderates the effects of exogenous attention on the sensitivity to gains and losses in risky lotteries," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    6. Qian, Jun & Zhang, Tongda & Zhang, Yingfeng & Chai, Yueting & Sun, Xiao & Wang, Zhen, 2023. "The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 442(C).
    7. Jinkwon Lee & Sujin Min, 2021. "The effects of repeated induction of emotions on cooperation and punishment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 925-943, July.
    8. Gerald E. Ezirim & Peter O. Mbah & Ejikeme J. Nwagwu & Ikechukwu Charles Eze & George C. Nche & JohnBosco C. Chukwuorji, 2021. "Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sub-Saharan African Sample: Contributions of Personality and Religiosity," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 1087-1107, February.

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