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Scorecasting: Framing Effects in a Finitely Repeated 2x2 Zero-Sum Game

Author

Listed:
  • Russell W Louks

    (Michigan Technological University)

  • Thomas E Merz

    (Michigan Technological University)

  • Heather Sorcha

    (Michigan Technological University)

Abstract

This study reports results from a laboratory experiment that examined choices of university students playing a finitely repeated 2x2 simultaneous zero-sum game. The stage game is a conventional representation of choices in sports such as soccer (penalty kicker vs. goalkeeper) and tennis (server vs. receiver). In each treatment, a real-time scoreboard displayed the history of players' choices and which player won the round. We examined whether the frequencies of choices by university students were dependent on whether scoring was visually cast as a gain (positive frame) or a loss (negative frame). Results aligned with the game-theoretic prediction of no significant differences in choices due to framing.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell W Louks & Thomas E Merz & Heather Sorcha, 2022. "Scorecasting: Framing Effects in a Finitely Repeated 2x2 Zero-Sum Game," Journal of Economic Insight, Missouri Valley Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 33-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:mve:journl:v:48:y:2022:i:1:p:33-46
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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