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Constitutions of Exception: The Constitutional Foundations of the Interruption of Executive and Legislative Function

Author

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  • Jonathan N. Katz
  • Mathew D. McCubbins

Abstract

Constitutions of exception are commonplace legal regimes that prescribe conditions and procedures under which the constitution itself can be legally suspended. Often the suspension of the constitution involves the interruption of scheduled elections for the national legislature and/or the chief executive. Military participation in civilian government and the derogation of civil liberties and rights are also typical. There is a debate in the literature about the value of exception clauses. We argue that they threaten democratic stability and consolidation. We do this by studying a large panel of countries and their constitutions over the twentieth century.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan N. Katz & Mathew D. McCubbins, 2018. "Constitutions of Exception: The Constitutional Foundations of the Interruption of Executive and Legislative Function," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(1), pages 77-98, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201803)174:1_77:coetcf_2.0.tx_2-z
    DOI: 10.1628/093245617X15120238641848
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; coups; panel study; elections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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