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Cooperation in Partnerships: The Role of Breakups and Reputation

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  • Ralph-C. Bayer

Abstract

1000 We investigate experimentally if endogenous partnership formation improves efficiency in social dilemmas. Subjects play multiple two-player public-goods games, where they can break up with their partner periodically. A stable-marriage mechanism based on rankings provided by singles determines the new matches. We vary the information subjects have on possible matches and whether staying in a partnership leads to a cost or a bonus. We find that endogenous group formation can increase efficiency. Both the provision of contribution history and bonuses have positive effects. At least one of these factors is required for efficiency improvements. The presence of both leads to the best results.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph-C. Bayer, 2016. "Cooperation in Partnerships: The Role of Breakups and Reputation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(4), pages 615-638, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201612)172:4_615:ciptro_2.0.tx_2-4
    DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14610627109836
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman, 2013. "Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games," Working Papers 2013-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Kamei, Kenju, 2016. "Information Disclosure and Cooperation in a Finitely-repeated Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 75100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Lachlan Deer & Ralph-C. Bayer, 2016. "Pledges of Commitment and Cooperation in Partnerships," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, January.
    4. Guido, Andrea & Robbett, Andrea & Romaniuc, Rustam, 2019. "Group formation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A survey and meta-analytic evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 192-209.
    5. Serdarevic, Nina & Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve, 2021. "It pays to be nice: The benefits of cooperating in markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Mutual choice of partner and communication in a repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 12-23.
    7. Kamei, Kenju, 2020. "The Perverse Costly Signaling Effect on Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future," MPRA Paper 103678, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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