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Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy

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  • Sophie Bade

Abstract

Four papers that use ambiguity aversion in political economy are reviewed. The first two (Bade, 2011a and 2011b) find that two important puzzles (equilibrium existence with multidimensional issue spaces and platform convergence) of the Downs-Hotelling model of electoral competition can be addressed by modeling parties as ambiguity-averse. The second two papers pertain to the Condorcet model of information aggregation. Ghirardato and Katz (2006) explains selective abstention through ambiguity aversion. Ellis (2012) shows that this abstention motive can be strong enough to prevent any information aggregation.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Bade, 2013. "Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(1), pages 90-106, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201303)169:1_90:aaimop_2.0.tx_2-j
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X660447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2020. "Collective Reputation and Learning in Political Agency Problems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1110, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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