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A Theoretical Model of Optimal Forest Resource Regimes in Developing Economies

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  • Shashi Kant
  • R. Albert Berry

Abstract

The standard economic theory of natural-resource management has its roots in a conventional economic theory of commons that overlooked the role of institutional structures and the transaction costs. Hence, it has not been able to explain cases of successful management of forests as common property. An economic model in-corporating the role of transaction costs has been developed. A mathematical form that can represent the general nature of a transaction function is suggested. Static models for separable and nonseparable transformation and transaction functions are discussed. The possibility of different resource regimes being optimal in different socioeconomic conditions is highlighted.

Suggested Citation

  • Shashi Kant & R. Albert Berry, 2001. "A Theoretical Model of Optimal Forest Resource Regimes in Developing Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 331-355, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200106)157:2_331:atmoof_2.0.tx_2-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bell, Frederick W, 1972. "Technological Externalities and Common-Property Resources: An Empirical Study of the U. S. Northern Lobster Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(1), pages 148-158, Jan.-Feb..
    2. Pranab Bardhan, 1993. "Symposium on Management of Local Commons," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 87-92, Fall.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang Yiwen & Shashi Kant & Hexing Long, 2020. "Collective Action Dilemma after China’s Forest Tenure Reform: Operationalizing Forest Devolution in a Rapidly Changing Society," Land, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-18, February.
    2. Kijazi, Martin Herbert & Kant, Shashi, 2011. "Social acceptability of alternative forest regimes in Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, using stakeholder attitudes as metrics of uncertainty," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 242-257, April.
    3. Kant, Shashi, 2003. "Extending the boundaries of forest economics," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 39-56, January.
    4. Misra, Dinesh & Kant, Shashi, 2005. "Economic efficiency and shadow prices of social and biological outputs of village-level organizations of joint forest management in Gujarat, India," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 141-160, December.
    5. Misra, Dinesh & Kant, Shashi, 2004. "Production analysis of collaborative forest management using an example of joint forest management from Gujarat, India," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3-4), pages 301-320, June.
    6. Shahi, Chander & Kant, Shashi, 2007. "An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to the strategies of community members under Joint Forest Management regime," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 763-775, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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