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Cross Holdings in Germany

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  • Michael Adams

Abstract

A characteristic of the German firms' ownership and control structure is the fact that the data featuring these markets are not available. Asking for reasons why concealing the control and shareholder structure is defended so strongly by representatives of banks and insurance companies, it becomes obvious that its aim is to hide a network of cross holdings among the most important German financial and industrial enterprises and to obscure the extreme concentration of power of banks and insurance companies in Germany. Cross holdings serve as restraints of competition in the market for corporate control to protect the powerful position of a small group of managers, whose power is based on widely spread shareholdings, the pooling of voting rights of nominee shareholders by proxy voting, and asset management by insurance and investment funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Adams, 1999. "Cross Holdings in Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 1-80, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_80:chig_2.0.tx_2-3
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuel Petrakis & Panagiotis Skartados, 2022. "First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 303-311, October.
    2. Carlos León & Javier Miguélez, 2021. "Securities cross-holding in the Colombian financial system: a topological approach," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 786-806, February.
    3. Qing Hu & Aika Monden & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2022. "Downstream Cross‐Holdings and Upstream R&D," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 775-789, September.
    4. Bessler, Wolfgang & Vendrasco, Marco, 2022. "Corporate control and shareholder activism in Germany: An empirical analysis of hedge fund strategies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Yasuhiro Arikawa & Atsushi Kato, 2015. "Cross Shareholding and Initiative Effects," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(2), pages 305-319, February.
    6. Schmidt, Reinhard H., 2003. "Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/36, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    7. Andreani, Ettore, 2003. "Corporate Control and the Financial System in Germany: Recent Changes in the Role of Banks," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 37, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    8. Jürgens, Ulrich & Rupp, Joachim & Vitols, Katrin & Jäschke-Werthmann, Bärbel, 2000. "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value in Deutschland," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Regulation of Work FS II 00-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Patrick Velte & Stefan Weber, 2011. "Outsider- und Insider-Systeme der Corporate Governance," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 473-482, April.
    10. Kathrin Johansen & Saskia Laser & Doris Neuberger & Ettore Andreani, 2017. "Inside or outside control of banks? Evidence from the composition of supervisory boards," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 31-58, February.
    11. Andreani, Ettore & Dummann, Kathrin & Neuberger, Doris, 2009. "Composition of supervisory boards in Germany: Inside or outside control of banks?," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 103, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    12. Wolfgang Bessler & Wolfgang Drobetz & Julian Holler, 2015. "The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 21(1), pages 106-147, January.
    13. Streitferdt, Felix, 1999. "Warum beteiligen sich Banken an anderen Unternehmen?," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 513, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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