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Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The Daimler-Chrysler Case

Author

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  • Theodor Baums

Abstract

This paper describes the legal structure of the Daimler-Chrysler merger. It asks why this specific structure rather than another cheaper way was chosen. This leads to the more general question of the pros and cons of mandatory corporate law as a regulatory device. The article advocates an "optional" approach: The legislator should offer various menus or sets of binding rules among which the parties may choose.

Suggested Citation

  • Theodor Baums, 1999. "Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The Daimler-Chrysler Case," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 119-119, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199903)155:1_119:ccadrt_2.0.tx_2-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Blasko, Matej & Netter, Jeffry M. & SinkeyJr., Joseph F., 2000. "Value creation and challenges of an international transaction The DaimlerChrysler merger," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 77-102, February.
    2. Arturo Bris & Christos Cabolis, 2002. "Corporate Governance Convergence by Contract: Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm293, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2003.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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