Mutual Monitoring and Best Agency Contracts
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Cited by:
- Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude & Viennot-Briot, Nathalie, 2019.
"Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2018. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2018-11, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
- David Masclet & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2019. "Can Whistleblower Programs Reduce Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-02301968, HAL.
- Joeri Sol, 2010. "Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Misty L. Loughry & Henry L. Tosi, 2008. "Performance Implications of Peer Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(6), pages 876-890, December.
- Yusheng Kong & Takuriramunashe Famba & Grace Chituku-Dzimiro & Huaping Sun & Ophias Kurauone, 2020. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Listed Chinese Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-26, April.
- Joeri Sol, 2016. "Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Coworker Relations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 56-76, March.
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JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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