IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urndoi10.1628-jite-2024-0033.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Endogenous Information Disclosure in Contests with Delegation

Author

Listed:
  • Pan Sang Kang

Abstract

We study a two-player contestwith delegation in which each player has discretion over whether or not to disclose information about her delegation contract to the rival party. By investigating each player's decision on information disclosure, we show the following: When the players' valuations of the prize are the same or not too different, one of the two players discloses information about her contract, and the other player does not. However, when their valuations of the prize are too different, only the player with a lower valuation of the prize discloses information about her contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Pan Sang Kang, 2024. "Endogenous Information Disclosure in Contests with Delegation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 180(4), pages 577-596.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2024-0033
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0033
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/endogenous-information-disclosure-in-contests-with-delegation-101628jite-2024-0033
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1628/jite-2024-0033?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contests; delegation; contracts; information disclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2024-0033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.