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Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Thomas
  • Tim Worrall

Abstract

This paper provides our reflections on self-enforcing wage contracts.We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution, and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature, and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2023. "Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 441-469.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2023-0039
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0039
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    limited commitment; relational contracts; risk sharing; limitedcommitment; relationalcontracts; risksharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

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