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The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders

Author

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  • Karine Brisset
  • François Cochard
  • François Maréchal

Abstract

Considering the sale of an asset by a first-price sealed-bid auction, we analyze the effect of a right-of-first-refusal (ROFR) clause, under which a buyer can match the highest bidder. When the buyers do not exactly know their competitors' degree of risk aversion, we compare their optimal bidding strategies with and without an ROFR. Then, when the seller does not exactly know each buyer's degree of risk aversion, we determine some sufficient conditions under which an ROFR cannot increase the seller's expected revenue. However, when she knows that information and when two buyers compete, we show that granting an ROFR can increase her expected revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2020. "The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(3), pages 526-548.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/jite-2020-0034
    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0034
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Isenhardt, Lars & Seifert, Stefan & Huettel, Silke, 2021. "On the price effect of a right-of-first-refusal in farmland auctions," 95th Annual Conference, March 29-30, 2021, Warwick, UK (Hybrid) 312053, Agricultural Economics Society - AES.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    right of first refusal; first-price auction; heterogeneous risk aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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