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Hypergeorgism: When Rent Taxation Is Socially Optimal

Author

Listed:
  • Ottmar Edenhofer
  • Linus Mattauch
  • Jan Siegmeier

Abstract

Imperfect altruism between generations may lead to insufficient capital accumulation. We study the welfare consequences of taxing the rent on a fixed production factor, such as land, in combination with age-dependent redistributions as a remedy. Taxing rent enhances welfare by increasing capital investment. This holds for any tax rate and recycling of the tax revenues except for combinations of high taxes and strongly redistributive recycling. We prove that specific forms of recycling the land rent tax - a transfer directed at fundless newborns or a capital subsidy - allow reproducing the social optimum under parameter restrictions valid for most economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ottmar Edenhofer & Linus Mattauch & Jan Siegmeier, 2015. "Hypergeorgism: When Rent Taxation Is Socially Optimal," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(4), pages 474-505, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201512)71:4_474:hwrtis_2.0.tx_2-6
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X14425626525128
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kalkuhl, Matthias & Fernandez Milan, Blanca & Schwerhoff, Gregor & Jakob, Michael & Hahnen, Maren & Creutzig, Felix, 2017. "Fiscal Instruments for Sustainable Development: The Case of Land Taxes," MPRA Paper 78652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Richters, Oliver & Siemoneit, Andreas, 2021. "Making markets just: Reciprocity violations as key intervention points," ZOE Discussion Papers 7, ZOE. institute for future-fit economies, Bonn.
    3. Kalkuhl, Matthias & Fernandez Milan, Blanca & Schwerhoff, Gregor & Jakob, Michael & Hahnen, Maren & Creutzig, Felix, 2018. "Can land taxes foster sustainable development? An assessment of fiscal, distributional and implementation issues," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 338-352.
    4. Matthias Kalkuhl & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2017. "Ramsey meets Thünen: the impact of land taxes on economic development and land conservation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 350-380, April.
    5. Petrucci, Alberto, 2020. "Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 421-427.
    6. Mattauch, Linus & Klenert, David & Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2022. "Overcoming wealth inequality by capital taxes that finance public investment," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 383-395.
    7. Dao, Nguyen Thang & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2018. "Feldstein meets George: Land rent taxation and socially optimal allocation in economies with environmental externality," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 20-41.
    8. Richters, Oliver & Siemoneit, Andreas, 2020. "System change, not climate change? Marktwirtschaft zwischen Utopie und Wachstumszwang," ZOE Discussion Papers 5, ZOE. institute for future-fit economies, Bonn.
    9. Max Franks & David Klenert & Anselm Schultes & Kai Lessmann & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2018. "Is capital back? The role of land ownership and savings behavior," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(5), pages 1252-1276, October.
    10. Oliver Richters & Andreas Siemoneit, 2018. "The contested concept of growth imperatives: Technology and the fear of stagnation," Working Papers V-414-18, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2018.
    11. Shulu Che & Ronald Ravinesh Kumar & Peter J. Stauvermann, 2021. "Taxation of Land and Economic Growth," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-20, April.
    12. Richters, Oliver & Siemoneit, Andreas, 2019. "Growth imperatives: Substantiating a contested concept," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 126-137.
    13. Gregor Schwerhoff & Ottmar Edenhofer & Marc Fleurbaey, 2020. "Taxation Of Economic Rents," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 398-423, April.
    14. Max Franks & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2020. "Optimal Redistributive Wealth Taxation When Wealth Is More Than Just Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 8093, CESifo.
    15. Siegmeier, Jan & Mattauch, Linus & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2018. "Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 366-378.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    land rent tax; overlapping generations; revenue recycling; social optimum;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land

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