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Optimal Taxation of Capital and Labor Income with Social Security and Variable Retirement Age

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  • Philippe Michel
  • Pierre Pestieau

Abstract

This paper extends the Diamond overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security by allowing for variable retirement age and for distortionary taxation of earnings and interest income. The tax rates are shown to depend on whether or not debt policy is available, and on the compensated elasticities of the two key variables: the amount of saving and the age of retirement. The relative tax on earnings, and thus the downward distortion on the age of retirement, is shown to be low if the age of retirement has a high tax elasticity and if, when there is no debt policy, there is underaccumulation (with respect to the modified golden rule).

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Michel & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Optimal Taxation of Capital and Labor Income with Social Security and Variable Retirement Age," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(2), pages 163-176, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(2002/200305)59:2_163:otocal_2.0.tx_2-c
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    Cited by:

    1. Artige, L. & Dedry, A. & Pestieau, P., 2014. "Social security and economic integration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 318-322.
    2. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2004. "The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(11), pages 2227-2258, September.
    3. Marc Fleurbaey & Marie‐Louise Leroux & Pierre Pestieau & Gregory Ponthiere, 2016. "Fair Retirement Under Risky Lifetime," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 177-210, February.
    4. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2002. "Départ à la retraite d'un point de vue de la taxation optimale," CREPP Working Papers 0212, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
    5. Bütler, Monika & Ramsden, Alma, 2016. "Pricing annuities: The role of taxation in retirement decisions," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145525, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Vincenzo Galasso, 2006. "Postponing Retirement: the Political Push of Aging," CSEF Working Papers 164, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Puhakka, Mikko, 2005. "The effects of aging population on the sustainability of fiscal policy," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 26/2005, Bank of Finland.
    8. Pestieau, P., 2001. "Are We Retiring Too Early?," Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie 2001/03, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie.
    9. Bütler, Monika & Ramsden, Alma, 2017. "How taxes impact the choice between an annuity and the lump sum at retirement," Economics Working Paper Series 1701, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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