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A Cure Rather than a Disease: Government Ownership and Minority Shareholder Protection

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  • Mihail K. Miletkov

    (University of New Hampshire, USA)

Abstract

The governments which undertake privatization of their state owned enterprises often maintain some ownership in the newly privatized firms. This paper examines the effect of the presence of the government as a minority shareholder on the protection of the minority shareholders in privatized firms. Consistent with the government’s incentive to foster security market development and to enlist the support of the median-class voters for the privatization process we find that the government effectively monitors the controlling shareholders in the newly privatized firms and curbs their ability to expropriate the minority shareholders. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that minority government ownership acts as a substitute for the lack of alternative mechanisms for minority shareholder protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihail K. Miletkov, 2014. "A Cure Rather than a Disease: Government Ownership and Minority Shareholder Protection," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 18(1-2), pages 1-41, March - J.
    • Handle: RePEc:mfj:journl:v:18:y:2014:i:1-2:p:1-41
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    privatization; private benefits of control; government ownership; investor protection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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