Regulatory Incoherence and Economic Potential of Freshwater Recreational Fisheries: The Trout Triangle in South Africa

We apply John R. Commons’s negotiational psychology, specifically his principle of sovereignty, to the development of a discordant regulatory culture and its likely impact on the economic potential of recreational fishing. Using South African environmental judicial precedents and other documentation, we formulate six plausible hypotheses. We argue that regulatory incoherence, entitlement insecurity, corporate-dominated social valuation, strategic power coalitions, lack of procedural fairness, and the extent of judicial enforcement of environmental rights help explain the economic potential and isolation of the freshwater recreational fisheries sector. We find a consistent pattern of extraction and monopolization of sovereign power by the Department of Mineral Resources from propertied parties. Thus, regulatory domination is a major mechanism affecting the economic potential of recreational fisheries in the Trout Triangle. While Commons postulated that private property is a sufficient condition for participation in the determination and use of sovereign power, we argue that private/public property is only a necessary condition. The conjunctive sufficient condition is the existence of both regulatory coherence between spheres of government and property.