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Dynamic Career Incentive Versus Policy Rent-Seeking in Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes: Testing a Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination in China

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  • Hans Hanpu Tung

Abstract

In this paper, I study the effect of political elites’ career incentives on China’s trade policy formation. I propose a theoretical dynamic view in which China’s authoritarian leaders can preempt protectionist actions of their selectorate (bureaucrats) by offering them future promotion opportunities within the authoritarian hierarchy as long as the leaders can credibly commit to these political promises. Drawing on a database of China’s sectors for 1999–2007, the empirical results support the dynamic perspective that while political organization still matters for China’s trade policy outcomes, it is less likely for a sector with a higher promotion expectation score to get politically organized.

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  • Hans Hanpu Tung, 2014. "Dynamic Career Incentive Versus Policy Rent-Seeking in Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes: Testing a Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination in China," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(S6), pages 51-68, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:emfitr:v:50:y:2014:i:s6:p:51-68
    DOI: 10.1080/1540496X.2014.1013848
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    Cited by:

    1. Marina Chuchko, 2022. "Business representation in an autocratic regime: Tariff policy and exchange committees in late Tsarist Russia," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(3), pages 801-829, August.

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