Ultimate Controller Ownership and Firm Value in Taiwan
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Cited by:
- Wang, Hui & Shen, Huayu & Tang, Xiaoyi & Wu, Zuofeng & Ma, Shuming, 2021. "Trade policy uncertainty and firm risk taking," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 351-364.
- Ruiqi, Wang & Wang, Fangjun & Xu, Luying & Yuan, Changhong, 2017. "R&D expenditures, ultimate ownership and future performance: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 47-54.
- Ming-Feng Hsu & Kehluh Wang, 2014. "The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2S), pages 159-173, March.
- Chai Bin‐Feng & Sultan Sikandar Mirza & Tanveer Ahsan & Ammar Ali Gull & Bakr Al‐Gamrh, 2022. "Institutional environment, the ultimate controller's characteristics and CSR disclosure in China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(5), pages 1515-1527, July.
- Shah, Muhammad Hashim & Xiao, Zuoping & Abdullah, & Quresh, Shakir & Ahmad, Mushtaq, 2020. "Internal pyramid structure, contract enforcement, minority investor protection, and firms’ performance: Evidence from emerging economies," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
- Ming-Feng Hsu & Kehluh Wang, 2014. "The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(S2), pages 159-173.
- Jing Zhou & On Kit Tam & Wei Lan, 2016. "Solving agency problems in Chinese family firms – A law and finance perspective," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(1), pages 57-82, February.
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Keywords
cash flow rights; control rights; entrenchment; ownership; panel threshold effects; Tobin's q;All these keywords.
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