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Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Author

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  • Jindřich Matoušek
  • Lubomír Cingl

Abstract

This article experimentally examines two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms—a simultaneous multi-round auction and its extension with combinatorial bidding—that offer the opportunity to communicate and thus collude. The general setting and parametrization originated in the 2013 Czech Spectrum Auction. The results suggest that the package bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Strikingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in the examined auction formats. A cheap-talk collusive agreement resulted in better allocation, as compared to the treatments without communication. The authors hypothesize that combinatorial bidding makes the decision-making of bidders too complicated and causes inefficiency, especially in auctions with large numbers of goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Jindřich Matoušek & Lubomír Cingl, 2018. "Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 28-56, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:mes:eaeuec:v:56:y:2018:i:1:p:28-56
    DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2017.1394161
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    Cited by:

    1. Proeger, Till & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2016. "The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 271, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. Olivier Bochet & Manshu Khanna & Simon Siegenthaler, 2024. "Beyond Dividing the Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(1), pages 163-191.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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