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Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment

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  • Beetsma, Roel M W J
  • Jensen, Henrik

Abstract

We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty. Finally, their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy. Without these, preference uncertainty is never desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(1), pages 129-136, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:1:p:129-36
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    1. repec:bla:germec:v:10:y:2009:i::p:32-49 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moise, 2008. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences," MPRA Paper 13907, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
    3. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers in Public Economics 115, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    4. Geraats, P.M., 2005. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0557, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Meixing Dai, 2016. "Static And Dynamic Effects Of Central Bank Transparency," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 55-78, January.
    6. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Unions, Fiscal Policy And Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(5), pages 617-633, September.
    7. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2015. "Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 523-545, September.
    8. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Meixing Dai & Qiao Zhang, 2013. "Central bank transparency with the cost channel," Working Papers of BETA 2013-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    10. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2016. "Central bank transparency and exchange rate volatility effects on inflation-output volatility," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 125-133.
    11. Ummad Mazhar, 2013. "Does Greater Transparency Stabilize Output? Evidence from Panel Data," SBP Working Paper Series 59, State Bank of Pakistan, Research Department.
    12. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2011. "Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3068-3076.
    13. Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March.
    14. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Oros, Cornel & Zimmer, Blandine, 2015. "Uncertainty and fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why does monetary policy transmission matter?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 85-93.
    16. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2008. "On the Sources and Value of Information: Public Announcements and Macroeconomic Performance," Economics Series Working Papers 411, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    17. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse, 2011. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 195-208, September.
    18. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    19. Hahn Volker, 2009. "Transparency of Central Bank Preferences," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 32-49, February.
    20. Meixing Dai & Qiao Zhang, 2017. "Central bank transparency under the cost channel," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 189-209, June.
    21. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2009. "Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency," Working Papers of BETA 2009-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    22. Geraats, P.M., 2004. "Modelling Stochastic Relative Preferences," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0468, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    23. Tillmann, Peter, 2008. "The conservative central banker revisited: Too conservative is more costly than too liberal," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 737-741, December.

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