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Variable Sperrklauseln in Parlamenten am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2021

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  • Hiller Tobias

    (Universität Leipzig Institut für Theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre Leipzig Deutschland)

Abstract

An electoral threshold is a provision in a proportional representation system where parties below a certain share of all votes are not taken into account in the allocation of mandates. However, electoral thresholds also cause distortions and mean that not all the votes of those entitled to vote are taken into account. These two effects must be weighed up against each other when introducing electoral thresholds. Hiller (2023) introduced a concept based on cooperative game theory to measure the difficulties in forming coalition governments. One possible application of this concept is the determination of the electoral threshold in the aftermath of an election with the aim of not exceeding a defined difficulty in forming a coalition government. We exemplify this idea for the election to the German Bundestag 2021.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiller Tobias, 2025. "Variable Sperrklauseln in Parlamenten am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 2021," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 74(1), pages 63-76.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:74:y:2025:i:1:p:63-76:n:1002
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2024-2022
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Abstimmungsmacht; Sperrklauseln;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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