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ÖPP – Eine vorteilhafte Beschaffungsvariante für die künftige Infrastrukturgesellschaft

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  • Sieg Gernot

    (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster IVM, Am Stadtgraben 9, 48143 MünsterGermany, Tel.: (0251) 83–22901)

  • Wigger Berthold U.

    (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, Finanzwissenschaft und Public Management, Kronenstraße 34, 76133 KarlsruheGermany, Tel.: (0721) 608–43731)

Abstract

Whether or not the government will be able to set the right incentives for the newly founded Infrastrukturgesellschaft (Infrastructure Company), especially for minimizing life cycle costs, remains an open question. During the first few years, human resources that are inevitably tied up in establishing the company are then not available for the management of road works. Beneficial highway projects should not be excluded through a debt limit, but realized by means of Public Private Partnerships. Therefore, even though the Infrastrukturgesellschaft may ultimately improve its ability to build efficient highways in Germany, in the meantime, especially large projects should be achieved through Public Private Partnerships.

Suggested Citation

  • Sieg Gernot & Wigger Berthold U., 2017. "ÖPP – Eine vorteilhafte Beschaffungsvariante für die künftige Infrastrukturgesellschaft," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(3), pages 239-245, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:66:y:2017:i:3:p:239-245:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2017-0017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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