Vertikale Integration von Fluglinien und Flughäfen: Eine wettbewerbsökonomische Analyse

Over the course of the last few years privatization of commercial airports has been called for by economists internationally and it is already pushed by politicians. Furthermore, in some cases privatization is taking place in combination with vertical integration. Consequently, private airlines hold entire or partial stakes in an airport or, vice versa, an airport becomes a stakeholder in a private airline. This paper shows that privatization of commercial airports, alongside its many economic benefits, may result in economic problems or create risks if vertical integration is observed simultaneously. The risk of discriminatory access to airport infrastructure is specifically discussed. Furthermore, vertical integration is shown to create problems only in some areas of airports. The supposed problem of discriminatory access lies exclusively in the area of aeronautical facilities. Additionally, we establish that vertical integration of airlines and airports is considerably more problematic if the airport does not have a hub function. As far as competition policy is concerned prohibiting vertical integration of aeronautical facilities would be the first best solution. Alternatively, access to the facilities might be regulated with regard to price and other anti-competitive practices. This conclusion holds true especially for non-hub airports.