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Eine effiziente vertikale Verteilung der Exekutivkompetenzen bei der Regulierung von Telekommunikationsmärkten in Europa

Author

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  • Haucap Justus

    (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Lehrstuhl für Wettbewerbstheorie und -politik, Universitätsstr. 150, GC3/62, 44880 Bochum)

  • Kühling Jürgen

    (Universität Karlsruhe, Zentrum für angewandte Rechtswissenschaft (ZAR), Institut für Informationsrecht, Fasanengarten 5, Geb. 50.31, 76128 Karlsruhe)

Abstract

The present paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of centralising regulatory competencies in the European telecommunications sector. As we demonstrate, political economy suggests that an over- rather than an under-regulation of telecommunications markets has to be expected. This tendency has been strengthened by the allocation of competencies under the new regulatory framework which endows the European Commission with far reaching veto rights under the so-called article 7 procedure. In order to delimit the risk of over-regulation through institutional safeguards, it should be easier for regulators to deregulate than to regulate a market. Current suggestions and ambitions by the Commission to extend its veto right or to even establish a European regulator for telecommunications should be dismissed. Instead, we suggest limiting the Commission’s veto rights to (a) markets, in which regulation creates significant international externalities and (b) cases, where national regulators do not move into the direction of deregulation. If, however, a national regulator decides to deregulate a market, the Commission’s ex ante veto right should be abandoned (but ex post intervention by the Commission still be possible) in order not to hamper deregulation which tends to be the desired result, in principle.

Suggested Citation

  • Haucap Justus & Kühling Jürgen, 2006. "Eine effiziente vertikale Verteilung der Exekutivkompetenzen bei der Regulierung von Telekommunikationsmärkten in Europa," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 55(3), pages 324-356, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:55:y:2006:i:3:p:324-356:n:7
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2006-0307
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    Cited by:

    1. Haucap, Justus & Lange, Mirjam R. J. & Wey, Christian, 2012. "Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 27, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Wendel, Julia, 2015. "Innovativeness of national regulatory authorities in EU telecommunications," 2015 Regional ITS Conference, Los Angeles 2015 146330, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. I. Vogelsang, 2015. "Will the U.S. and EU telecommunications policies converge? A survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(2), pages 117-155, June.
    4. Wolfgang Kerber & Julia Wendel, 2014. "Regulation of Network Sectors in the EU: A Federalist Perspective," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201422, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Wolfgang Kerber & Julia Wendel, 2016. "Regulatory Networks, Legal Federalism, and Multi-level Regulatory Systems," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201613, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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