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Bankenrettung, „constructive ambiguity“ und moralisches Risiko

Author

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  • Vollmer Uwe

    (University of Leipzig, Institute for Theoretical Economics / Monetary Economics, Grimmaische Straße 12, D-04109 Leipzig)

  • Diemer Michael

    (University of Leipzig, Institute for Theoretical Economics / Microeconomics, Grimmaische Straße 12, D-04109 Leipzig)

Abstract

Based on the model of Cordella and Yeyati (2003) this paper compares the effect of several bailout strategies of a „lender of last resort“ (LoLR) on a bank’s risk behaviour. We show that both „constructed ambiguity“, defined as a properly mixed strategy, and a pure strategy where a LoLR rescues always or never are not the optimal strategies. The LoLR should rather apply a contingent rule which means that he should announce and commit ex ante to a bailout policy depending on a verifiable state of nature. For this reason the optimal bailout policy should not be case by case, but follow an ex ante defined rule. Consequently, there is no contradiction between incentive efficiency and transparency of an efficient LoLR-policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Vollmer Uwe & Diemer Michael, 2011. "Bankenrettung, „constructive ambiguity“ und moralisches Risiko," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 62(2), pages 139-159, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:reveco:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:139-159
    DOI: 10.1515/roe-2011-0203
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