IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ksp/journ1/v2y2015i4p445-459.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Political Influence on Creating of Saving-Investment Gap in Transition Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Damir PIPLICA

    (University of Split, Croatia.)

Abstract

Governments of transition countries should become aware of the importance of implementation of such an economic policy that would encourage higher saving rates and at the same time bringing it in accordance with investment rates in order to achieve other important macroeconomic goals, without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability of their respective economies. Transition countries EU members have not conduct such an economic policy, which resulted in existence of a substantial difference between total investments and gross national savings in their countries. Although the influence of saving on investments was significant, conducting of economic (investment) policy of the right-wing governments of the transition countries EU members has more influenced imbalance of saving and investment in comparison to the left-wing governments. Should the right-wing governments, in applying of economic measures that stimulate higher investment rate than previous, follow their ideological point of view instead of turning to 'middle' voters, they would have an easier position in reducing saving-investment gap and in achieving macroeconomic stability in comparison to the left-wing governments. However, should the right-wing governments turn more opportunistically to 'middle' voters, instead following their ideological programme, that would make their position difficult in reducing saving-investment gap, because influence of saving to investment would be significantly lesser. Increasing of saving rate with left-wing governments would have significantly weaker influence on balancing of saving and investment in comparison to the right-wing governments, but their opportunistically turning to 'middle' voters would create slightly better position in realizing of macroeconomic stability, because by this their influence on reducing saving-investment gap would be improved compared to the situation when they would follow their left-oriented party programme.

Suggested Citation

  • Damir PIPLICA, 2015. "Political Influence on Creating of Saving-Investment Gap in Transition Countries," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, KSP Journals, vol. 2(4), pages 445-459, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksp:journ1:v:2:y:2015:i:4:p:445-459
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/download/501/584
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.kspjournals.org/index.php/JEPE/article/view/501
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Florin-Marius PAVELESCU, 2009. "Savings-Investments Relationship in an Open Economy," Romanian Journal of Economics, Institute of National Economy, vol. 29(2(38)), pages 85-106, December.
    2. Robert M. Solow, 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.
    3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    4. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    5. Eswar S. Prasad & Raghuram G. Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2007. "Foreign Capital and Economic Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 38(1), pages 153-230.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thanh C. Nguyen & Vítor Castro & Justine Wood, 2022. "Political environment and financial crises," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 417-438, January.
    2. Reischmann, Markus, 2016. "Creative accounting and electoral motives: Evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 243-257.
    3. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2015. "Budget, expenditures composition and political manipulation: Evidence from Portugal," NIPE Working Papers 4/2015, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    4. Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 215-224.
    5. Monika Köppl-Turyna, 2016. "Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 177-216, September.
    6. Umeno, Luis Gustavo & Bugarin, Maurício Soares, 2008. "Electoral Control in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 28(1), May.
    7. Stein, Ernesto H. & Streb, Jorge M., 2004. "Elections and the timing of devaluations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 119-145, May.
    8. Michał Mackiewicz, 2006. "Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-22.
    9. Uwe Dulleck & Berthold U. Wigger, 2012. "Expert Politicians, Electoral Control, and Fiscal Restraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 3738, CESifo.
    10. Gupta, Sanjeev & Liu, Estelle X. & Mulas-Granados, Carlos, 2016. "Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 101-114.
    11. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    12. Jablanovic, Vesna D., 2013. "The Government Spending On Agribusiness Sector Model," 50th Anniversary Seminar, Agriculture and Rural Development -Challenges of Transition and Integration Processes, September 27, 2013 161816, University of Belgrade, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Agriculture.
    13. Ziogas, Thanasis & Panagiotidis, Theodore, 2021. "Revisiting the political economy of fiscal adjustments," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    14. Klein, Michael W, 1996. "Timing Is All: Elections and the Duration of United States Business Cycles," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(1), pages 84-101, February.
    15. Efthyvoulou, Georgios, 2011. "Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 638-662.
    16. Helene Ehrhart, 2013. "Elections and the structure of taxation in developing countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 195-211, July.
    17. Troeger, Vera & Schneider, Christina J., 2012. "Strategic Budgeteering and Debt Allocation," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 85, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    18. Oliver Pamp, 2008. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," European Political Economy Review, European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium, vol. 8(Spring), pages 4-39.
    19. Funashima, Yoshito, 2016. "The Fed-induced political business cycle: Empirical evidence from a time–frequency view," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 402-411.
    20. V�tor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2016. "Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 34-37, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Saving; Investment; Political parties; Transition countries; Economic policy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ksp:journ1:v:2:y:2015:i:4:p:445-459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bilal KARGI The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Bilal KARGI to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kspjournals.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.