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Abstract
In seeking how achievements hitherto can be further advanced, the study sets out to clarify two groups of questions. First it asks whether competition, as a self-regulating system, can operate in the whole economy, or only in part of it. Secondly, it asks what problems should be purposefully influenced by special regulations in the part of the economy the author calls the competitive sphere. The study states it is desirable in that sphere to realize development harmonized with demand, which is partly set but partly only influenced by socialist economic policy. In this sense it is expedient to orientate enterprises with basically uniform indicators in line with the known interests of society. Since competition has self-regulating effects, other tools of purposive socialist economic policy must be developed. To achieve favourable external effects the state must implement action programs. But it will not be expedient automatically to finance actions defined in material terms (volume data) or via technical parameters. To hinder proliferation of preferences, ease the burden on the state budget, and maintain the competitive position of enterprises obtaining preferences, it will be advisable to grant only fixed-sum subsidies in chosen fields based on proposals from the specialists in central bodies. The second problem discussed concerns the conditions in which a well-functioning, self-regulating system can emerge in an economy where the bulk of means of production is publicly owned. By 1968 it was clear that creating autonomous enterprises with a profit motive was a precondition for competition. Experience in the last four years shows that enterprises have not become autonomous, though their independence has much increased. The author sees competition being hindered by the position of enterprises as parts of a uniform, hierarchical system subordinate to branch ministries, to which the accepted prime indicator of enterprise success is only secondary. The author proposes transforming the organizational and institutional order of the economy, increasing the possibility of distinguishing the central interests of the state from those of profit-motivated enterprises. Supervision of enterprises and flows of assets among them could be achieved by creating a system of production and commercial banks.
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JEL classification:
- P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
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