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Why Do or Do Not Nations Settle Their Disputes Bilaterally?: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of GATT Article XXII

Author

Listed:
  • Gi-Hong Kim

    (Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze why nations do or do not settle their disputes bilaterally. This paper provides a strategic bargaining model, based on the framework of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). According to this model, delay benefit, industry characteristics, and reputation loss turn out to be important in the bilateral stage. Empirical evidence regarding industry characteristics and reputation loss is dissatisfactory because of insufficient data. This paper, however, strongly indicates that delay benefit is the most important factor in that most nations prefer to transfer their disputes into the multilateral stage.

Suggested Citation

  • Gi-Hong Kim, 1999. "Why Do or Do Not Nations Settle Their Disputes Bilaterally?: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of GATT Article XXII," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 15, pages 213-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199912-15-2-01
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GATT; Bilateral Negotiations; Bargaining Model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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