IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kea/keappr/ker-199712-13-2-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tax Evasion and Pricing Schemes for Monopolist

Author

Listed:
  • Pang Ryong Kim

    (Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute)

Abstract

This paper analyzes some aspects of decision making of a tax-evading monop-olistic firm facing a uniform pricing and two part tariffs. It is shown that an im-position of tax, in the former case. is expected to increase social welfare, while the reverse is true in the latter. On the other hand, in both tariffs, it is also shown that an imposition of tax increases the output level and does not change the fraction of over-repored cost while if the penalty fee is imposed on the firm, it decreases the fraction of over-reported cast as well as the firm's output level.

Suggested Citation

  • Pang Ryong Kim, 1997. "Tax Evasion and Pricing Schemes for Monopolist," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 111-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199712-13-2-07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-199712-13-2-07.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sang-Ho Lee, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions Revisited: Strategic Firm Behavior," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 5(1), pages 83-92, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax Evasion; Uniform Pricing; Two-part-Tariffs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199712-13-2-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: KEA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/keaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.