The Coming of Game Theory
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, April.
- Reghinos D. Theocharis, 1983. "Early Developments in Mathematical Economics," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, edition 0, number 978-1-349-04949-3, December.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cesarino Bertini & Josep Freixas & Gianfranco Gambarelli & Izabella Stach, 2013. "Comparing Power Indices," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-19.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022.
"Long information design,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Long Information Design," PSE Working Papers halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03700394, HAL.
- Koessler, Frédéric & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," TSE Working Papers 22-1341, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Marie Laclau & Frédéric Koessler & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-03342880, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Frédéric Koessler & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342880, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jerôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long information design," Post-Print hal-03700394, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Long Information Design," Working Papers halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003.
"The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers hal-00593645, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1344, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Eilon Solan & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1337, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," HEC Research Papers Series 760, HEC Paris.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Working Papers hal-00242999, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464949, HAL.
- Xiaochi Wu, 2022. "Existence of value for a differential game with asymmetric information and signal revealing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 213-247, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2018.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew Kosenko, 2020. "Mediated Persuasion," Papers 2012.00098, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
- Xiaochi Wu, 2021. "Differential Games with Incomplete Information and with Signal Revealing: The Symmetric Case," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 863-891, December.
- Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013.
"A detail-free mediator,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
- Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008.
"Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
- Frederic Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2006. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," THEMA Working Papers 2006-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00360739, HAL.
- Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage communication with and without verifiable types," Post-Print hal-00360739, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016.
"Repeated games with public information revisited,"
PSE Working Papers
hal-01285326, HAL.
- Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
- Makoto Shimoji, 2016. "Rationalizable Persuasion," Discussion Papers 16/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021.
"Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk,"
Papers
2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
- Renou, Ludovic & Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 16801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022.
"Data Collection by an Informed Seller,"
TSE Working Papers
22-1330, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
- Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2023. "Opaque Contracts," Papers 2301.13404, arXiv.org.
- Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2024. "Perfect Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2402.06765, arXiv.org.
- repec:fip:fedrer:y:1984:i:sep/oct:p:13-22:n:v.70no.5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2023.
"Information Nudges and Self-Control,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2182-2197, April.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information nudges and self-control," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2018-304, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 13299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information nudges and self-control," Working Paper Series in Economics 119, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2023. "Information nudges and self control," Post-Print hal-04198487, HAL.
- Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 7346, CESifo.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self Control," TSE Working Papers 18-914, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2021.
- Mariotti, Thomas & Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2018. "Information Nudges and Self Control," IAST Working Papers 18-84, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Jun 2021.
- Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2022. "Information nudges and self control," Working Papers hal-03629566, HAL.
- Thomas Mariotti & Nikolaus Schweizer & Nora Szech & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "Information Nudges and Self-Control," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_311, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015.
"The Limits of Price Discrimination,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000776, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Working Papers 1464, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2014.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2013. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1896R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2013.
- Golosov, Mikhail & Skreta, Vasiliki & Tsyvinski, Aleh & Wilson, Andrea, 2014.
"Dynamic strategic information transmission,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 304-341.
- Mikhail Golosov, 2009. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," 2009 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 11-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1802, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2013. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," Working Papers 13-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Mikhail Golosov & Vasiliki Skreta & Aleh Tsyvinski & Andrea Wilson, 2011. "Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission," EIEF Working Papers Series 1110, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised May 2011.
- Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin, 2010. "Repeated games with public uncertain duration process," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 29-52, March.
- Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Pen'elope Hern'andez & Zvika Neeman & Eilon Solan, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Two States," Papers 2209.06536, arXiv.org.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:1-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.