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Optimum pricing of mutual guarantees for credit

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Listed:
  • Yoram Kroll
  • Assaf Cohen

Abstract

The main finding of this paper is that under financial market impediments and asymmetric information, a mutually guaranteed and correctly schemed and priced insurance credit contract should have an abnormal actuarial profit. Such a contract improves welfare by simultaneously eliminating underinvestment (UI) and overinvestment (OI) and by reducing the probability of the insurer’s ruin. This solution is relevant for mutual credit insurance agencies and international or governmental agencies interested in increasing the value creation of small and medium enterprises that suffer from limited access to equity and debt markets. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Yoram Kroll & Assaf Cohen, 2013. "Optimum pricing of mutual guarantees for credit," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 253-262, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:253-262
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-012-9430-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Columba, Francesco & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2010. "Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-54, April.
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    5. Bartoli, Francesca & Ferri, Giovanni & Murro, Pierluigi & Rotondi, Zeno, 2013. "Bank–firm relations and the role of Mutual Guarantee Institutions at the peak of the crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 90-104.
    6. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    8. Yoram Kroll & Assaf Cohen, 2000. "Alternative Solutions to Underinvestment, Under Equity and Credit Rationing," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3-4), pages 395-421.
    9. Allan Riding & Judith Madill & George Haines, 2007. "Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 47-61, June.
    10. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Amarjit Gill & Craig Wilson, 2021. "Bank connections and small business performance: Evidence from Canadian survey data," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5110-5134, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit insurance; Mutual guarantees; Moral hazard; Asymmetric information; SME; Underinvestment (UI); Overinvestment (OI); G21; G22; G32; L26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

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