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The effectiveness of chief financial officer board membership in improving corporate investment efficiency

Author

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  • Yin Liu

    (The College at Brockport State University of New York)

  • Huiqi Gan

    (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

  • Khondkar Karim

    (University of Massachusetts Lowell)

Abstract

The key roles of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in firm operating performance, corporate strategic choices, and corporate governance have been increasingly emphasized in recent decades. In this study, we empirically investigate the relation between CFO board membership and corporate investment efficiency to determine whether CFO presence on the board reduces firms’ propensity to over- or underinvest. We find that CFO board membership is significantly associated with a decreased level of corporate over- and underinvestment. Further, the positive effects of CFO board membership on corporate investment efficiency are greater for firms with greater information asymmetries. Last but not least, we find that the improved investment efficiency experienced by firms with CFOs on their boards has a positive effect on the firms’ future performance. Overall, we find that CFO board membership is associated with improved investment efficiency and firms’ future profitability. By documenting the real business impact of CFO board membership on investment efficiency and firms’ future performance, we add bricks to the literature on board composition and how it influences firms’ strategic choices and performance. Our findings suggest that having CFOs on boards could benefit firms’ investment practices, which directly relate to corporate strategic performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Yin Liu & Huiqi Gan & Khondkar Karim, 2021. "The effectiveness of chief financial officer board membership in improving corporate investment efficiency," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 487-521, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:57:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s11156-020-00953-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-020-00953-2
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    2. Huai-Chun Lo & Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou, 2022. "The effect of CEO power on overinvestment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 23-63, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CFO board membership; Overinvestment(s); Underinvestment(s); Investment efficiency; Board performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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