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Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

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  • João Teixeira

Abstract

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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  • João Teixeira, 2014. "Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 327-356, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:327-356
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-013-0344-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele & Rossini, Gianpaolo, 2017. "Financing flexibility: The case of outsourcing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 35-65.
    2. Jing Wang & Wei Li & Arno Forst, 2021. "Product market competition, stock price informativeness, and IFRS adoption: evidence from Europe," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1537-1559, May.
    3. György Ottilia & Madaras Szilárd, 2020. "Factors Influencing SME Outsourcing: Evidence from Romania," Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 8(1), pages 5-18, October.
    4. João Teixeira, 2014. "Outsourcing with debt financing," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 13(1), pages 1-24, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Outsourcing; Long term contracts; Uncertainty; Financial distress; D81; G32; G33; L23; L24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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