IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/rqfnac/v23y2004i3p191-206.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

Author

Listed:
  • Darius Palia
  • Robert Porter

Abstract

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Darius Palia & Robert Porter, 2004. "The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 191-206, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:191-206
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0924-865X/contents
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ting-Fang Chiang & E-Ching Wu & Min-Teh Yu, 2007. "Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 205-222, August.
    2. Muhammad Imran Khan & Muhammad Ghous & Muhammad Jabbar & A. Hanif & N. Ramzan, 2023. "Risk And Executives Compensation: An Industry-Wise Analysis Of Pakistan Non-Financial Sectors," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 12(2), pages 87-92.
    3. Bryan Stanhouse & Duane Stock, 2016. "Credit line takedown and endogenous bank capital," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 691-723, May.
    4. Angelos Kanas, 2014. "The impact of prompt corrective action on the default risk of the U.S. commercial banking sector," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 393-404, August.
    5. Cullen F. Goenner, 2018. "The market for private student loans: an analysis of credit union exposure, risk, and returns," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1227-1251, May.
    6. Chen, Hsiao-Jung & Lin, Kuan-Ting, 2016. "How do banks make the trade-offs among risks? The role of corporate governance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(S), pages 39-69.
    7. David VanHoose, 2010. "Regulation of Bank Management Compensation," NFI Policy Briefs 2010-PB-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    8. Wahyoe Soedarmono & Philippe Rous & Amine Tarazi, 2011. "Bank Capital and Self-Interested Managers: Evidence from Indonesia," Working Papers hal-00918584, HAL.
    9. Shujun Ding & Zhenyu Wu & Yuanshun Li & Chunxin Jia, 2010. "Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: a legal approach perspective," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 445-471, November.
    10. Jamshed Iqbal & Sami Vähämaa, 2019. "Managerial risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1229-1258, November.
    11. Li-Hua Lai & Li-Chin Hung & Chau-Jung Kuo, 2016. "Do Well-Financial Holding Company Organized Banks in Taiwan Take More Risk?," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-30, December.
    12. Egly, Peter V. & Sun, Jun, 2014. "Trading income and bank charter value during the financial crisis: Does derivatives dealer designation matter?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 355-370.
    13. Hongfei Tang, 2014. "Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 251-292, February.
    14. Lin Guo & Abu Jalal & Shahriar Khaksari, 2015. "Bank executive compensation structure, risk taking and the financial crisis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 609-639, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:191-206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.