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Strategic Decision Making of the Firm under Asymmetric Information

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  • Luo, Guo Ying
  • Brick, Ivan
  • Frierman, Michael

Abstract

This paper develops a simple signaling model whereby high valuation firm uses levels of investment, debt and dividends to convey information to the market regarding its valuation. Conditions are determined under which investment, debt and dividends are employed in a separating Nash equilibrium. Unlike many other signaling models where the source of asymmetric information concerns only the mean of the firms' cash flow, our model allows for two sources of asymmetric information: the mean and the variance of the cash flow. This paper finds that the choice of signals depends on the relative importance of these two sources of informational asymmetry. For example, we show that high valued firms signal their values by decreasing their debt if the source of asymmetric information is mainly driven by the variance of the cash flows. This latter result differs from the debt signaling models found in the literature. The findings of this paper are consistent with extensive empirical evidence. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Luo, Guo Ying & Brick, Ivan & Frierman, Michael, 2002. "Strategic Decision Making of the Firm under Asymmetric Information," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 215-237, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:215-37
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sung Bae & Hoje Jo, 2007. "Underwriter warrants, underwriter reputation, and growth signaling," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 129-154, August.
    2. Bong Soo Lee & Nathan Mauck, 2018. "Informed Repurchases, Information Asymmetry and the Market Response to Open Market Share Repurchases," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(03), pages 1-32, September.
    3. Fan, Wei & Ying, Qianwei & Meng, Guo, 2023. "The signaling effect of policy loans: Do commercial banks follow up or stand by?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).

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