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Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs—Introduction to the Special Issue

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  • Stephen Martin

    (Purdue University)

Abstract

This special issue is occasioned by the 50th anniversary of the publication of Williamson’s (Am Econ Rev 58:18–36, 1968a) seminal analysis of the impact of mergers on market performance. The Introduction reviews Williamson’s work on the topic, and introduces the seven contributions to the special issue. Four are empirical; two are theoretical; and one focuses on policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Martin, 2019. "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs—Introduction to the Special Issue," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 327-338, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:55:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-019-09715-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-019-09715-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philippe Aghion & Nick Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(2), pages 701-728.
    2. Scherer, Frederic Michael, 2012. "Merger Efficiencies and Competition Policy," Scholarly Articles 9830356, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    4. Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 45-65, Springer.
    5. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    6. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    7. Baumol, William J & Panzar, John C & Willig, Robert D, 1983. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 491-496, June.
    8. Williamson, Oliver E, 1969. "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 954-959, December.
    9. Stephen Martin, 2019. "The Potential Compensation Principle and Constant Marginal Utility of Income," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 383-393, September.
    10. R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
    11. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter L. Ormosi, 2019. "Post-merger Price Dynamics Matters, So Why Do Merger Retrospectives Ignore It?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 403-429, November.
    12. Stephen Martin, 2019. "The Kaldor–Hicks Potential Compensation Principle and the Constant Marginal Utility of Income," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 493-513, November.
    13. Williamson, Oliver E, 1969. "Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 105-118, May.
    14. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal mergers; Merger policy; Oliver Williamson;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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