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Economics at the FTC: Deceptive Claims, Market Definition, and Patent Assertion Entities

Author

Listed:
  • Julie Carlson

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Ginger Zhe Jin

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics
    University of Maryland)

  • Matthew Jones

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Jason O’Connor

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Nathan Wilson

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

Abstract

Economists in the FTC’s Bureau of Economics (BE) perform a variety of economic analyses to support the Commission’s missions to protect consumers and maintain competition. This analysis can affect important decisions via many avenues. This article describes examples where BE analysis has served as an input into a Commission investigation of deceptive claims, supported testimony in court proceedings in hospital mergers, and provided the empirical foundation for a study of immediate policy relevance on intellectual property.

Suggested Citation

  • Julie Carlson & Ginger Zhe Jin & Matthew Jones & Jason O’Connor & Nathan Wilson, 2017. "Economics at the FTC: Deceptive Claims, Market Definition, and Patent Assertion Entities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(4), pages 487-513, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:51:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9596-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-017-9596-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. J. K. Pappalardo, 2022. "Economics of Consumer Protection: Contributions and Challenges in Estimating Consumer Injury and Evaluating Consumer Protection Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 201-238, June.
    2. Lawrence J. White, 2020. "Antitrust Economics And Consumer Protection Economics In Policy And Litigation: Why The Disparity?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1555-1564, October.
    3. Nathan E. Wilson, 2021. "The Impact of Competition on Investment: Evidence From California Hospitals," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 1-32, March.

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